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Abstract: Export Controls are becoming an increasingly important dimension of international relations, 
however there is still relatively little literature on their usage and implementation. The following article 
attempts to show the development and problems surrounding export controls in a new area: surveillance 
technologies. These have recently been integrated into international frameworks for export controls, 
bringing with them a row of challenges and questions for policy makers. Based on extensive conversa­
tions with practitioners and key experts in the field, this paper attempts to sketch out key ideas and solu­
tions in this area as well as important responses that have been developed to (perceived) challenges.
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Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing concern about oppressive regimes using surveillance technologies in ways that lead to human rights violations. As a result 
of these concerns, export controls of surveillance technologies are developing into 
an important mechanism of promoting human rights on the Internet. The following 
article intends to provide an overview over the key points of the debate. How has 
the debate on surveillance technologies developed in recent years, what problems 
have been identified by experts within this debate and what are the main policy so­
lutions they suggested?
The first section provides a brief overview of the growing body of evidence that op­
pressive regimes purchased surveillance technologies to monitor and censor citizens on­
line, leading to violations to right to privacy and freedom of expression. In the second 
section, the paper summarizes existing initiatives from international organisations, EU 
institutions and member states, private sector and civil society which seek to restrict ex­
ports of such technologies to countries where they can be used to harm human rights.
Input from various key experts is included in section three and we are particularly 
grateful for the participants of the expert workshop organise on 5 February 2015 at the 
Netherlands Embassy in Berlin whose input was key in developing the third section. 
Finally the conclusion provides some ideas on how to move the debate forward and per­
spectives for the future.
1 This research paper is part of a research project “Export controls of surveillance technologies” con­
ducted by the Centre for Human Rights at the European University Viadrina (CIHR) and funded by the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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1. The Impact of Surveillance Technologies on Human Rights
The Arab Spring of 2011 demonstrated that the impact of technology on human rights 
is twofold. On one hand, citizens of several countries in Middle East and North Africa 
used and profited of latest technologies on an unprecedented scale to fight for their rights 
and freedoms. On the other hand, the repression that followed the protests revealed that 
governments had built technological capacity to monitor their citizens online and offline. 
In many cases, these newly employed technologies enabled government to implement 
measures harming human rights.
The use of surveillance technologies is most frequently associated with infringements 
of the freedom of speech and the right to privacy. However, those are not the only rights 
affected -  governments can use surveillance to limit freedom of assembly or increase dis­
crimination based on ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation. In the context of the 
most repressive regimes, individuals targeted by surveillance are at risk of discrimina­
tion, physical violence, imprisonment, torture and death.
The cases of human rights abuses are very diverse and include serious human rights 
challenges in many different countries. For example Anita Gohdes argues that in Syria 
the Internet is being used as a weapon of war with Internet disconnection (Gohdes, 2015). 
Her research suggests that: “regimes implement large-scale disruptions selectively and 
purposely in conjunction with launching larger battles. Evidently, not all battles are ac­
companied by outages, but when they are, they tend to be preceded by a substantial in­
crease in violence” (Gohdes, 2015, p. 13). There is a clear link in here research between 
the Syian disconnection of networks and surveillance, which is has repeatedly been sug­
gested are externally sourced (Waleed, 2011).
This however is not the only case of European or North American surveillance tech­
nologies being used for targeted and mass surveillance purposes. Indeed Companies in 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy devel­
oped surveillance technologies used in Iran, Syria, Bahrain and Tunisia (Wagner, 2012). 
There are even specific company names that have been presented, with products devel­
oped by European companies Gamma, Trovicor, Hacking Team and Amesys reported to 
have been used to commit violations of human rights (Benedek, Kettemann, 2014).
Also it should be noted that these challenges are by no means restricted to the Middle 
East, indeed command and control servers for FinSpy backdoors, part of Gamma Interna­
tional’s FinFisher ‘remote monitoring solution’ were discovered in a total of 25 countries, 
many of which have long histories of human rights abuse (Citizen Lab, 2013). Moreover 
these technologies need to be seen in the context of a global market for surveillance tech­
nologies has been growing by 20% annually and is estimated to be worth 3 to 5 billion 
dollars by industry representatives (Silver, 2011).
There are also clear and evident regulatory failures in this process. The amount of EU 
surveillance technologies sold abroad without a license is increasing. Unlicensed surveil­
lance technology sales by Gamma are estimated at 20 million euros in 2013 alone, many 
times more than all German licensed surveillance technology exports combined (Wag­
ner, Guarnieri, 2014). Yet at the same time the spread across the world of these surveil­
lance technologies has been a considerable challenge for many actors, as it is unclear 
what regulatory responses could be effective (Hosein, Palow, 2013). Thus authors such as
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Wagner (2012) have proposed a variety of measures that might constitute effective re­
sponses to the problem, while also noting that none of these measures are likely to be fully 
effective but that all represent limited responses to a challenging problem.
Four years after the start of the Arab Spring, there has been a growing body of evi­
dence that various governments from different parts of the world, purchased surveillance 
technologies produced by companies located in the European Union. Civil society, re­
searchers and investigative journalists have been incessantly uncovering evidence of sur­
veillance technologies exported from Europe to countries where human rights might be 
harmed. Some of the key findings are summarized here:
But what are surveillance technologies? While the understanding of surveillance tech­
nologies that can be used to harm human rights has developed over time to encompass the 
following technologies:
1) tools for interception & monitoring of mobile telephony such as ‘IMSI-Ca- 
tchers’, which “make it possible for the government directly to monitor mobile 
communications without having to involve the carriers” (Hosein, Palow, 2013);
2) mass communications surveillance technologies that allow for the mass and 
indiscriminate surveillance of large data streams at a network level where the 
collection of information “ is, by definition, arbitrary” (Bauman et al., 2914);
3) targeted surveillance technologies that allow for the surveillance of one speci­
fic individual device or set of devices, typically through means of the use of in­
trusion technologies (Maras, 2013).
Thus these definitions will be used in the following discussion when the types of sur­
veillance and negative effects on human rights are discussed further.
2. Reactions from Experts: Integrating Human Rights into Export Control
Findings about export of technologies from EU to countries where human rights 
might be harmed have motivated civil society organizations, governments and industry to 
take action. There has been a growing consensus that the EU should review its export con­
trol measures to bring them in line with its commitment to protect human rights in third 
countries.
2.1 International Initiatives
2.1.1. Wassenaar Arrangement
Of the existing international export control regimes that exist, the Wassenaar Ar­
rangement is perhaps best equipped to govern dual-use ICT technologies at a global 
level. Currently the Wassenaar Arrangement remains the key coordinating point for har­
monizing export controls among the 41 participating states.2 The Wassenaar Arrange-
2 For further details see: Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls fo r  Conventional Arms and 
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, http://www.wassenaar.org/participants/index.html.
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ment controls exports by cooperating to establish a common List of Dual-Use Goods 
and Technologies that is then voluntarily implemented to national laws by participat­
ing states. Participating countries also exchange information about specific denials 
and licenses.
EU member states were among the main proponents of stronger regulation of surveil­
lance technologies on the level of the Wassenaar Arrangement. During the annual plenary 
meeting in December 2013 in Austria, two EU members on behalf of the expert group 
proposed that the list be expanded to include two types of surveillance technologies: 
“Systems, equipment, and components therefor, specially designed or modified for the 
generation, operation or delivery of, or communication with ‘intrusion software’” and 
mass “IP network surveillance systems.” (Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
No 1382/2014, p. 132-133). These measures adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement en­
tered into force in the EU on 31 December 2014.
2.1.2 Freedom Online Coalition
The Freedom Online Coalition (FOC) is composed of governments, civil society and 
private sector around the world from a mix of developed and developing countries. 
The Coalition’s goal is to coordinate diplomatic efforts to support free expression, asso­
ciation, assembly, and privacy online. In October 2014, the Coalition has called on gov­
ernments and businesses to curb use of surveillance technology in an international, 
multistakeholder effort, which “should include the development of appropriate and con­
sistent national laws and policies governing the use and export of such technologies.”3
2.2. European Union Initiatives
Since the onset of the Arab Spring, EU governments have increased their efforts to 
prevent surveillance technologies from getting to countries where human rights might be 
abused. To this end, the EU has already updated sanctions to Syria and Iran and imple­
mented changes agreed within the Wassenaar Arrangement which came into force on 
31 December 2014. It is also currently pursuing a broad review of its existing export con­
trol policies with a focus on ICTs and human rights which will be discussed in greater de­
tail below.
2.2.1. EU Restrictive Measures
In reaction to media reports about European companies delivering surveillance tech­
nologies to Iran and Syria, the European Union reacted by updating existing sanctions 
to include embargo on telecommunications monitoring and interception equipment in 
2012 (Council Decision 2012/168/CFSP) and 2013 (Council Decision 2013/255/CFSP) 
respectively. Moreover, the EU also prohibits export of equipment that might be used
3 For further details see Freedom Online Coalition: Statement on the Use and Export o f  Surveillance 
Technology, Freedom Online Coalition, https://www.freedomonlinecoalition.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2014/10/2-FOC-Joint-Statement-on-the-USe-and-Export-of-Surveillance-Technology-October-2014.pdf.
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for internal repression as part of measures targeting Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Republic 
of Guinea, Libya, Myanmar (Burma), and Zimbabwe (European Union Restrictive 
measures).
2.2.2. EU Dual-Use Regulation
The EU Dual-Use Regulation (EC) N°428/2009, is the primary document regulating 
the export of dual use goods and technologies, including surveillance technologies 
(Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009). It is through regular updates of this regulation 
that Wassenaar Arrangement lists are implemented by EU Member States. The regulation 
is directly binding for all member states, but the implementation and enforcement of the 
specific procedures takes place on the national level.
On 12 June 2014, the EU institutions adopted a joint statement acknowledging “the is­
sues regarding the export of certain information and communication technologies (ICT) 
that can be used in connection with human rights violations as well as to undermine the 
EU’s security, particularly for technologies used for mass-surveillance, monitoring, 
tracking, tracing and censoring, as well as for software vulnerabilities.” (Regulation (EU) 
No 599/2014) In the same document, the EU institutions committed to further developing 
“catch-all” mechanisms to control goods and technologies that fall outside of Annex I of 
the Regulation.
2.2.3 The European Commission
The European Commission has also demonstrated willingness to review existing poli­
cies in its Communication “The Review of export control policy: ensuring security and 
competitiveness in a changing world”. The Communication published on 24 April 2014, 
explicitly discusses a regulation of “cybertools for mass surveillance, monitoring, track­
ing and interception.” (The Review o f  export, 2014, p. 3).
As part of the process of reviewing export control policies, the European Commission 
is conducting an Impact Assessment and will explicitly include an impact assessment on 
the export of surveillance technologies. The will be completed by the end of 2015 and 
pave the way for an update to the dual use regulation in 2016.
On 22 October 2014, the Commission updated the EU list of dual-use items to include, 
IT intrusion software (‘spyware’) and IP surveillance equipment in line with the changes 
adopted at the Wassenaar plenary meeting in December 2013. It reiterated “growing se­
curity concerns regarding the use of surveillance technology and cybertools that could be 
misused in violation of human rights or against the EU’s security” (Commission updates, 
2014). The updates to the EU list entered into force on 31 December 2014 (Commission 
Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1382/2014).
2.2.4. The European Parliament
The European Parliament has been a strong voice pushing for change in the area of ex­
port controls for surveillance technologies. Of particular importance was the European 
Parliament resolution adopted on 5 April 2011 (European Parliament amendments) call-
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ing for a limitation of the export of surveillance technologies: “in connection with a viola­
tion of human rights, democratic principles or freedom of speech as defined by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to which Article 6 of the Treaty on 
the European Union refers, by using interception technologies and digital data transfer 
devices for monitoring mobile phones and text messages and targeted surveillance of in­
ternet use (for example through Monitoring Centres and Lawful Interception Gateways)” 
(European Parliament amendments).
Restriction of the export of surveillance technologies in Europe was also a key part of 
the Report on a Digital Freedom Strategy in EU Foreign Policy of the European Parlia­
ment Foreign Affairs Committee (2012/2094(INI)). The strategy explicitly explores the 
fact that EU-made technologies and services are sometimes used in third countries to vio­
late human rights through censorship of information, mass surveillance, monitoring, and 
the tracing and tracking of citizens and their activities on (mobile) telephone networks 
and the internet” (2012/2094(INI)).
Finally, in a resolution adopted on 17 July 2014, the European Parliament calls for an 
“EU-wide ban on the export to Egypt of intrusion and surveillance technologies which 
could be used to spy on and repress citizens, and for a ban, in line with the Wassenaar Ar­
rangement, on the export of security equipment or military aid that could be used to sup­
press peaceful protest” (Freedom o f expression, point 17). Export controls were also 
discussed at a public hearing organized jointly by the Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and the Committee on International Trade (Joint Public Hearing).
2.2.5. The Council o f  the European Union
On 21 November 2014 the Council of the European Union adopted conclusions re­
viewing the priorities of the EU’s trade agenda for the next five years, which express 
support for further development of the EU export controls (Outcome of the Council 
Meeting). In this document, the Council recognizes that “a tighter cooperation with aca­
demia and research centres would improve the control of ‘dual-use research’, while 
avoiding undue obstacles to the free flow of knowledge and the global competitiveness of 
EU science and technology.” In this document, the Council also calls upon Member 
States to assess the level of harmonization in licensing and in issuing denials, as well as to 
consider whether the application of “catch all” controls in the area of ICT & Human 
Rights for non-listed dual-use items could be further developed.
2.3. EU Member State Initiatives
The EU Regulation allows Member States to expand export controls to non-listed 
items priorities, if  they make use of this provision included in Article 8 of the Dual-Use 
Regulation. For example, Italy imposed such a unilateral requirement on the export of 
a “Public LAN database centralised monitoring system” to the Syrian Telecommunica­
tions Establishment in 2012 (Information Note). It was also under this article that the 
UK restricted exports of tropospheric scatter communication equipment using ana­
logue or digital modulation techniques to Iran in 2008 (The Export Control Order, 
2008).
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Member states can also play an important role by establishing soft law measures such 
as codes of conduct or guidelines for private sector. This approach was adopted in the 
UK, where trade association TechUK issued a guide to “Assessing Cyber Security Export 
Risks” for industry, which helps companies to understand the negative impacts that may 
arise from uses not intended by the seller (Assessing Cyber).
2.4. Private Sector Initiatives
The response of the representatives of the private sector is important in implementing 
human rights standards in the EU and its export practices with trade partners from outside 
of the EU. In a position paper on the review of export control policy in the EU, 
DIGITALEUROPE, an organization representing 59 international companies, recog­
nises a ‘special responsibility’ in controlling impact of their products on human rights.4 
The paper states that members “have introduced due diligence programs, applied range of 
policies and processes, and integrated human rights into their corporate culture, while re­
specting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights. DIGITALEUROPE members are committed to respect Hu­
man Rights throughout the lifecycle of their products and services, when it comes to de­
sign, development and use.”
Although big industry players have expressed their willingness to comply with human 
rights standards, corporate and government transparency measures would help to assess 
whether they follow through with their commitments. At the same time, it is important to 
remember that many of the most problematic surveillance technologies are produced and 
exported by small companies, which often manage to stay under the radar of public au­
thorities and civil society monitoring.
2.5. Civil Society Initiatives
Civil society organizations from the EU have intensified their advocacy in favour of 
greater restrictions in trade of surveillance technologies. In particular, the global Coali­
tion Against Unlawful! Surveillance Exports (CAUSE)5 has played an important role by 
compiling and analysing available evidence and urging governments to take action.6
Civil society organizations have also assisted victims of unlawful surveillance by fil­
ing complaints against EU companies to national courts -  in France cases against Amesys 
and Qosmos were filed by FIDH and LDH, and in the UK, Privacy International filed 
a complaint against Gamma (FIDH, 2014). Yet, the impact of civil society actors is lim­
4 For further details see: DIGITALEUROPE position paper on the review of export control policy in 
the EU Brussels, October 2014, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/ 
dv/412_digitaleurope_position_paper_/412_digitaleurope_position_paper_en.pdf.
5 The CAUSE initiative includes Privacy International, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty Internatio­
nal, Digitale Gesellschaft e.V., Open Technology Institute, FIDH and Reporters Without Borders.
6 For further details see: Coalition Against Unlawful Surveillance Exports, http://www.globalcau- 
se.net for further details.
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ited by lack of access to information about licenses requested and approved and the list of 
companies supplying surveillance technologies.
3. Analysing Existing Measures
There are numerous challenges and difficulties with existing implementations of ex­
port controls. This may perhaps stem from the fact that they stem from a historical attempt 
to regulate arms and limit the access of countries outside the west to advance technolo­
gies. As a result the way in which the system works presumes easily defined and categor­
ised products. While there have been arguments that it is technically impossible to 
regulate software, most surveillance vendors on the market typically also sell training and 
software updates while also developing a long term relationship with their customers. 
This suggests that surveillance vendors are seldom one off transactions. Indeed many are 
in a strong position to know more about their clients and the nature of the their use of the 
tools as recent documents provided during the recent massive leak of documents by sur­
veillance technology vendor Hacking Team suggest (Hern, 2015).
3.1. Transparency
However this does not mean on the flip side that export controls are the perfect solu­
tion for this problem. One of the greatest problems dealing with existing export control 
provisions is transparency. Many actors in this debate have suggested that more informa­
tion is needed to ensure that existing and future measures are effective. They also argue 
that information gathering cannot be limited to anecdotal data collected by investigative 
journalists, whistle-blowers and NGOs, although their work in this area remains crucial 
and should be supported. This is particularly problematic as much of the publicly avail­
able information about the surveillance technology trade needed to be attained through 
FOIA requests and parliamentary questions. What little information is available is ob­
tained through these ad-hoc means rather than stable and systematic information and doc­
umentation systems.
This problem is not uncommon for export controls of dual-uset techonologies more 
generally, as transparency to the general public remands a key issue (Holtom et al., 2013; 
Bromley et al., 2012). This has led even the OECD to call for greater transparency of ex­
port controls in arguing that:
“when a government is considering introducing an export restriction, it should 
publish sufficient information letting experts know about the initiative so that they 
can act upon the information. So that experts are in a position to adjust to change in
7 For further details see: Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Agnieszka Brugger, Dr. Konstantin von 
Notz, http://www.agnieszka-brugger.de/fileadmin/dateien/Dokumente/Abruestung/Ruestungsexpor- 
te/20140808_Antwort_KA_Spaehsoftware_Drs182067_1.pdf and Case No: C0/4089/2013 In the High 
Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division Administrative Court, Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, 
WC2A 2LL Date, 12/05/2014 18th and 19th March 2014, Approved Judgment, https://www.privacyin- 
ternational.org/sites/default/files/Privacy%20International_v_HMRC%20Judgment.pdf.
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policy, the government should publicise the planned action widely, give interested 
experts an opportunity to express their views and take such views into consider­
ation. Following enactment o f an export restriction, information should be pub­
lished well in advance o f its entry into force. The measure should be implemented 
and enforced in a transparent manner assuring all experts affected equal treatment 
and include a right to contest decisions and procedures” (Fliess, 2014).
Finally it should be noted that lack of transparency impedes independent research on 
the subject, accurate impact assessment of existing regulations and better public under­
standing of the issue. public institutions also need to be more supportive of systematic re­
search into the subject by voluntarily sharing data about licences they grant and reject.
When looking at empirical reality it is evident that while some countries have taken 
steps to improve transparency, access to data about what licences were granted or rejected 
is limited. Also some governments in the EU publish some information about individual 
export control licenses or make it available at request, either through parliamentary ques­
tions, freedom of information requests or simply contacting the export control authorities. 
Many are considering how to improve transparency and provide more information about 
licensing decisions to the public. To make matters even more puzzling the European 
Commission obtains considerable data about export licenses from the Member States, but 
cannot share it under current regulations. Last of all governments are reluctant to share 
data about licences, because it includes information about companies, which are poten­
tially confidential commercial information. However, governments could evidently share 
granular data, even if  it doesn’t disclose specific companies.
This is all happening under the backdrop of increasing private sector transparency. 
Transparency reports have become increasingly common in the Internet industry. Com­
panies like Twitter, Facebook, Google and Vodafone have all published transparency re­
ports about request for information about customers or removal of content received from 
law enforcement agencies in various countries. These existing transparency reports have 
not however shed light on the increasing growth of the surveillance trade that remains 
highly opaque. Clearly if private sector organisations believe that they are engaged in le­
gitimate transactions of goods that could be considered surveillance technologies either 
as buyers or sellers they should make these transactions public either in individualised or 
aggregate form.
3.2. Accurately Defining Scope of Regulation
As mentioned above one of the main challenges and debates about defining the 
scope of export control regulations. This question is particularly hotly debated, as many 
actors argue that not all surveillance technologies require an authorisation under cur­
rent export control regimes. Technologies evolve quickly and it is a challenge for all ac­
tors involved to make definitions clear. The main concern of civil society is for those 
definitions to be future-proof, to ensure that new technologies will be covered as they 
emerge. At the same time, clear parameters would help all actors involved: civil soci­
ety, the private sector and national agencies. At the same there are some bright spots on 
the Horizon. It seems possible that the EU group of technical experts from Member 
States governments (Surveillance Technologies Experts Group) could play a crucial
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role in bringing in technical knowledge and identifying surveillance technologies that 
pose a risk to human rights.
At the same time swift and effective responses are particularly problematic as they can 
hurt legitimate actors. The potential regulation of Fuzzers8 in the Wassenaar list, intended 
to control FinFisher trojans, has proved controversial among security researchers who are 
concerned it might hinder their work (Bratus, et al., 2014). These concerns are taken seri­
ously by many governments and regulatory agencies, who emphasised their intention to 
implement existing and future controls in a manner that does not negatively affect secu­
rity research. Yet questions still remain if these commitments are also backed up by law 
and the extent to which governments can be held to such commitments.
Another challenge that appears frequently relates to ‘legacy’ encryption controls that 
governments have kept on-going for decades with very few strong justifications. Mainly 
they argue that it allows them to be able to observe ‘interesting’ exports without actually 
being able to provide compelling evidence for their military or security relevance. This is 
particularly the case as encryption has become so common that its use is basically ubiqui­
tous across almost all generic computing technologies. To try to regulate encryption is to 
try to regulate most computing. Despite this under the current regime, export of certain 
cryptography products is restricted even though it can be used by legitimate actors, such 
as civil society members, journalists or researchers, to protect privacy of communications 
from surveillance.
3.3. Policy Instruments in the EU
Another key aspect that needs to be analysed are the role of policy instruments in the 
EU. The EU has the ability to create a regulatory model that is effective and based on high 
human rights standard. The EU can also provide regulation that is a template for similar 
regulatory measures in third countries. In this context the current review process of export 
control regulation is an important process, albeit lengthy and slow.9 Data collection and 
impact assessment are crucial, so maybe worth the wait: we need to get it right, so it is ‘fu­
ture-proof (Rajan, 2009; Director, Levi, 1956). One of the main challenges with the Reg­
ulation is ensuring uniform implementation across Member States. Subsidiaries take 
advantage of lack of uniformity. It has also been suggested that the reviewed regulation 
will have a direct reference to human rights. Also, so it can be used as a model for non-EU 
countries.
At the same time it should also be noted that the EU also has other mechanisms to re­
strict access to products which could lead to negative human rights consequences, the 
most notable of which is the anti-torture regulation. Some parties have suggested that 
while sanctions can be effective in some cases, this measure couldn’t be applied to all 
cases since sanctions are often decided really fast and not much consideration is given to 
specific technologies. Others suggested that there could also be some scope for a listing of
8 For further details see: Newly Controlled Items Under the Wassenaar Arrangement, http://dyma- 
xion.org/essays/wa-items.html.
9 For further details see: Public online consultation on the export control policy review (Regulation 
(EC) No 428/2009), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=190.
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surveillance technologies in the anti-torture regulation, as this mechanism was explicitly 
decided with human rights in mind and has more objective criteria for problematic human 
rights violations.
Conclusion
Export controls of surveillance technologies remain a heavily contested topic. Current 
debates about the issue suggest that governments, public institutions, civil society and 
majority of private sector actors share a common concern: preventing surveillance tech­
nologies from getting into the hands of oppressive governments. Indeed, effective mea­
sures to reduce illegitimate trade are supported by almost everyone except for vendors of 
surveillance technologies themselves. Sadly there is at this point little agreement on 
which measures are most urgent and effective in implemented these concerns.
Whatever approach is taken, it needs to be based on evidence about impact of specific 
measures. This in turn requires greater transparency from public and private actors. Steps 
forward should also take into consideration interests of legitimate actors and provide 
clear guidance for companies and for national licensing authorities. In short, moving for­
ward on export controls for surveillance technologies is not just possible but also urgently 
necessary to ensure that communications networks fulfil their promise of upholding hu­
man rights.
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Kontrola eksportu technologii nadzoru 
w ujęciu pomiędzy stosunkami międzynarodowymi a kontrolą zbrojeń
Streszczenie
Kontrole eksportu stają się coraz ważniejszym wymiarem stosunków międzynarodowych. Stale jest 
jeszcze jednak stosunkowo mało literatury na temat ich wykorzystania i wdrażania. Niniejszy artykuł 
jest próbą ukazania rozwoju i problemów związanych z kontrolą eksportu w nowym obszarze: technolo­
giach nadzoru, które niedawno zostały włączone do struktur międzynarodowych w zakresie kontroli 
eksportu, przynosząc ze sobą szereg wyzwań i pytań dla decydentów. Na podstawie przeprowadzonych 
rozmów z praktykami i kluczowymi ekspertami w tej dziedzinie autorzy artykułu próbują nakreślić naj­
ważniejsze pomysły i rozwiązania w tym obszarze, jak również istotne odpowiedzi, które zostały opra­
cowane w kontekście (dostrzegalnych) wyzwań.
Slowa kluczowe: kontrola eksportu, technologia nadzoru, stosunki międzynarodowe, global 
governance
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